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ABSTRACT
De´ja` vu is a nebulous memory experience defined by a clash between evaluations
of familiarity and novelty for the same stimulus. We sought to generate it in the
laboratory by pairing a DRM recognition task, which generates erroneous familiarity
for critical words, with a monitoring task by which participants realise that some of
these erroneously familiar words are in fact novel. We tested 30 participants in an
experiment in which we varied both participant awareness of stimulus novelty and
erroneous familiarity strength. We found that de´ja` vu reports were most frequent
for high novelty critical words (∼25%), with low novelty critical words yielding
only baseline levels of de´ja` vu report frequency (∼10%). There was no significant
variation in de´ja` vu report frequency according to familiarity strength. Discursive
accounts of the experimentally-generated de´ja` vu experience suggest that aspects
of the naturalistic de´ja` vu experience were captured by this analogue, but that the
analogue was also limited in its focus and prone to influence by demand character-
istics. We discuss theoretical and methodological considerations relevant to further
development of this procedure and propose that verifiable novelty is an important
component of both naturalistic and experimental analogues of de´ja` vu.
Subjects Cognitive Disorders, Neurology, Psychiatry and Psychology
Keywords Recognition, Memory, De´ja` vu, Familiarity, Novelty
De´ja` vu is defined as a “clash between two simultaneous and opposing mental evaluations:
an objective assessment of unfamiliarity with a subjective evaluation of familiarity” (p. 2,
Brown, 2004). The sensation has captured public interest, e.g., its discussion in Heller’s
(1961) ‘Catch 22’ and use as a plot device in ‘The Matrix’ (Silver, Wachowski & Wachowski,
1999), but its scientific investigation remains sparse, perhaps because the sensation is
fleeting and occurs unpredictably. Despite its volatility, the experience is by no means
uncommon—surveys usually find lifetime incidences in excess of 65%, with young adults
likely to report multiple yearly experiences (Brown, 2003). As such, de´ja` vu presents a
window into the healthy memory decision-making process through study of perturbations
to the signals it must adjudicate between.
Much of the research that has examined de´ja` vu has used the clinical case study
approach (e.g., Moulin et al., 2005; Bancaud et al., 1994) or employed retrospective
report to explore individual differences (Martin et al., 2012; O’Connor & Moulin, 2013).
Clinical studies allow the study of de´ja` vu-like experiences in samples for which they
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form part of a regularly occurring constellation of symptoms associated with a primary
disorder such as dementia or epilepsy. However, the correspondence between clinical
and nonclinical manifestations of de´ja` vu remains unclear, with the potential that they
may be mechanistically and subjectively different (e.g., clinical de´ja` vu associated with
dementia, termed de´ja` ve´cu, has behavioural consequences—unlike de´ja` vu in the healthy
population, patients with de´ja` ve´cu modify their behaviour to avoid the sensation of de´ja`
vu; Moulin et al., 2005). Retrospective reports, whilst affording study of de´ja` vu in the
healthy population, are often recovered weeks or months after the experiences occurred,
leaving them open to contamination by bias and reconstruction (Chapman & Mensh,
1951). Consequently, there has been a recent drive towards developing laboratory-based
procedures which reliably generate de´ja` vu in healthy volunteers. Such laboratory
analogues provide the opportunity for the ‘here-and-now’ study of nonclinical de´ja` vu
experiences and could yield insights into memory decision-making akin to those offered
into word-finding by the experimental generation of the tip-of-the-tongue sensation
(e.g., Widner, Smith & Graziano, 1996; Schwartz, 2001).
Attempts to find a laboratory analogue of de´ja` vu have primarily focused on generating
sensations of subjective familiarity. For example, Brown & Marsh (2009); building on
Jacoby & Whitehouse (1989), using subliminal presentation of symbols, and Cleary, Ryals
& Nomi (2009), using configural similarity for visual scenes, both generated familiarity
in the absence of awareness of its source. The frequency of de´ja` vu reports stemming
from these procedures was high, and the willingness of participants to categorise the
experimentally-generated experience as de´ja` vu likely reflects an overlapping experiential
feature, familiarity without recollection. Nevertheless it should be noted that experiences
more closely analogous to this experimentally-generated sensation, at least in their causal
mechanism, occur frequently without being labelled as de´ja` vu e.g., Mandler’s (1980)
example of the ‘butcher on the bus’ (formalised in the laboratory as recognition without
identification, Cleary, 2006). In the ‘butcher on the bus’ experience, an individual becomes
aware that they recognise someone, but cannot recollect who the person is because the
person (the butcher) is being encountered in a different context to that which they were
previously encountered (on the bus as opposed to in the supermarket). In the Brown
& Marsh (2009) and Cleary, Ryals & Nomi (2009) experiments, participants may have
misidentified the sensation of recognition without identification as de´ja` vu because both
experiences represent unusual memory sensations where retrieval feels incomplete. Our
rationale for continued work towards a laboratory analogue is that a compelling elicitation
of de´ja` vu should attempt to generate all of the components of the experience. In order to
do this, we refer again to the definition presented in the first paragraph which incorporates
subjective familiarity but also a concurrent awareness of objective unfamiliarity.
The key omission in the de´ja` vu generation procedures described above is the provision
of information allowing the participant to make an evaluation of unfamiliarity or novelty
to clash with the experimentally-generated familiarity. In these procedures, there was no
objective standard by which participants could verify that the stimuli provoking familiarity
had in fact not previously been encountered. With a view to generating a more complete
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laboratory analogue of naturalistic de´ja` vu, we developed a procedure during which some
stimuli elicit both subjective familiarity and an awareness of novelty. This procedure
builds on the DRM recognition task (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) in which
participants study a series of words (e.g., rest, bed and blanket) which are all semantically
linked to an unpresented word (sleep). This unpresented word, referred to as the critical
lure, typically yields illusory recognition when it is presented at test—the critical lure
generates a sensation of subjective familiarity. Our procedure pairs the DRM task with an
additional task in which participants monitor studied stimuli for a feature present only
in the critical lure (e.g., the starting letters ‘sle’). When participants become aware of the
absence of that feature from the study list words, they also become aware that the critical
lure must in fact be novel (see Fig. 1). Thus in critical lures, subjective familiarity clashes
with an objective awareness of novelty, satisfying the definition of de´ja` vu.
Using this new procedure, we independently varied objective novelty and subjective
familiarity, hypothesising that de´ja` vu reports would be greatest within lists for which the
greatest clash between familiarity and novelty was contrived. Assessing de´ja` vu occurrence
on a trial-by-trial basis allowed us to identify the specific word triggers of de´ja` vu. We
hypothesised that de´ja` vu triggers would be most numerous amongst the words for which
maximal familiarity/novelty conflict was generated, critical lures. Finally, we supplemented
our categorical de´ja` vu assessments with discursive responses which we acquired pre- and
post-experimentally. We asked participants to write about (i) a previous typical naturalistic
experience of de´ja` vu and (ii) the experimentally-generated experience of de´ja` vu according
to the same criteria. We used these responses to better understand the similarities and
differences between our experimentally-generated de´ja` vu experience and naturalistic de´ja`
vu experiences.
METHOD
Participants
Thirty English-speaking participants (20 female, 10 male; mean age = 24.1 years,
SD = 6.5 years) were tested and reimbursed at a rate of £5/h for their time. Written
consent was obtained from all participants. The protocol was approved by the University
Teaching and Research Ethics Committee at the University of St Andrews (approval
number PS10697).
Stimuli and materials
Over the course of the experiment, each participant was presented with 24 DRM word
lists based on Stadler, Rodiger & McDermott’s norms (1999). The 24 lists comprised the 12
which yielded the highest false alarm rates for critical lures and the 12 useable lists which
yielded the lowest false alarm rates. For each study list, 12 words were randomly selected
from the 15 words published per list in Stadler et al. For each test list, 3 old words (targets;
selected from the previously studied 12 words) were presented alongside 2 semantically
unrelated new words (unrelated lures), 2 semantically related new words (related lures;
these were randomly selected from the 3 words excluded from study presentation) and
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Figure 1 Schematic of study and test lists. A possible study and test list for a high familiarity DRM
list with critical lure ‘sleep’. At the start of the study list, participants were presented with a question
reminding them to monitor the study list for words beginning with a character string. The character string
remained onscreen throughout the study list. In this case, the high novelty condition string was ‘SLE’ and
the low novelty condition string was ‘B’. Participants were then presented with 12 words semantically
related to the unpresented critical lure, each word presented at 3 s intervals. At the end of the study list,
participants indicated the number of words presented which began with the character string. In high
novelty conditions, the correct answer was always ‘0’, in low novelty conditions the correct answer always
greater than 0. Six study lists were presented in each study phase before the test phase was initiated. At the
start of each test list, participants were reminded of the previously monitored string and the number of
words they reported at study beginning with this string. The reminder remained onscreen throughout the
eight-word test list. For each test trial, participants first indicated whether the word had been presented at
study (old) or not (new) and then indicated their confidence in this decision. Throughout both of these
self-paced decisions, participants could toggle their de´ja` vu response from (continued on next page...)
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Figure 1 (...continued)
‘none’ through ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’. Once participants made a confidence decision the next test trial
was initiated. In the schematic, different word conditions are shown bounded by different coloured boxes
and the reminder information is omitted from test words 2–8 for the sake of clarity. In the experiment
there was no differentiation of stimulus type visible to participants. The six test lists corresponding to the
six study lists from the preceding study phase were presented in the test phase. Over the entire experiment,
there were four study-test blocks.
the single critical lure (see Appendix S1 for four example study-test lists). All word lists
were presented on PCs running MATLAB (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, 2000) and
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997).
Two paper questionnaires were administered: a pre-experimental questionnaire; and
a post-experimental questionnaire. The pre-experimental questionnaire was completed
before the first study-test block and assessed participants’ previous de´ja` vu experience
(yes/no response) and frequency (<1, 1–4 or >4, times a year). There followed an
explanation of de´ja` vu based on Brown’s (2004) definition, “a feeling of familiarity
coupled with the knowledge that this familiarity is incorrect”, and an open-ended question
requested that participants write a short passage summing up previous de´ja` vu experiences
according to the following instructions: “Please provide a short account of a ‘typical’
de´ja` vu experience you have had. Try to include some detail concerning the following
points: Emotional intensity of a typical de´ja` vu experience; Duration of a typical de´ja` vu
experience; How a de´ja` vu experience might typically make you feel about the reliability
of your memory”. The post-experimental questionnaire, completed at the end of the
experiment, confirmed participants’ experiences of de´ja` vu during the experiment (yes/no
response) and was again followed by an open-ended question requesting a summary of the
experimentally-generated experience of de´ja` vu according to the following instructions:
“Please provide a short account of your de´ja` vu experience(s) during the experiment. Try
to include some detail concerning the following points: Emotional intensity of de´ja` vu
experience(s); Duration of de´ja` vu experience(s); How the de´ja` vu experience(s) made you
feel about the reliability of your memory”.
Design and procedure
We manipulated subjective familiarity by presenting participants with DRM lists yielding
the highest or the lowest critical lure false alarm rates according to Stadler, Rodiger &
McDermott (1999). Lists yielding high false alarm rates were used in the high familiarity
conditions. Lists yielding low false alarm rates were used in the low familiarity conditions.
We manipulated objective novelty by varying the string that participants monitored study
words for. For each study list, participants were presented with a new 1–3 character string,
and indicated the number of words which began with this string once they had seen all
12 words. For the high novelty lists, no words in the study list and only the critical lure
in the test list began with the character string. For the low novelty lists, at least one word
in the study list (and not the critical lure) began with the character string. During each
test list, the number of words indicated by participants as beginning with the string was
re-presented to participants, highlighting the novelty of critical lures in only the high
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novelty condition. Thus, there were two within-subjects list-level factors, novelty (high,
low) and familiarity (high, low). These combined to produce four types of list: (1) high
novelty-high familiarity; (2) high novelty-low familiarity; (3) low novelty-high familiarity;
and (4) low novelty-low familiarity. There was also one within-subjects word-level factor
with four levels: targets (previously studied words), unrelated lures (previously unstudied
words which were semantically unrelated to the studied words), related lures (previously
unstudied words but which were drawn from the same DRM list), and critical lures
(previously unstudied words to which all the studied words were semantically related).
All four word conditions were presented within each test list.
Over the course of the experiment, six study-test list pairs of each list type (high
novelty-high familiarity etc.) were presented (24 study-test list pairs in total). To allow
participants to rest periodically, the experiment was split into four study-test blocks.
The list composition of each block was randomly assigned such that participants
would not inevitably encounter each list type in each study-test block. Each study-test
block comprised six consecutive study lists, followed by six consecutive test lists. For
each participant, corresponding study and test lists were presented in the same order
(i.e., study1, study2, study3, study4, study5, study6, test1, test2, test3, test4, test5, test6).
Figure 1 shows a schematic of a study list and its corresponding test list. The
to-be-monitored character string was presented in size 48pt font alongside word stimuli
for the duration of each study list. Twelve words were serially presented in size 48pt font,
in the centre of the screen, for 3 s each. At the end of the study list, participants were
prompted to register the number of words beginning with the character string in that list
(0–5 indicated using the keyboard).
Throughout each test list, the previously-monitored character string and the number
indicated by the participant at the end of the study list were presented in size 48pt font, at
the top of the screen. Eight words (three targets, five lures) were then serially presented in
size 48pt font, in the centre of the screen. Test words were presented in a pseudorandom
order modelled on the procedure used by Roediger & McDermott (1995). A target always
occupied test position 1 and the critical lure always occupied test position 6, 7 or 8. (The
three targets selected comprised the word from study position 1, one word selected at
random from study position 2–6 and one from study position 7–12.) The remaining
targets and lures were allocated at random to the unoccupied test positions. Below each
word, the prompt, “old(b) or new(n)?”, presented in size 48pt font, cued participants to
indicate whether the word was previously presented at study or not. Once a response had
been made, a new prompt, “Confidence: L(1), M(2), H(3)?”, cued participants to indicate
their confidence in the previous decision using. All test responses were self-paced and
responses were made using the keyboard keys listed in parentheses.
In addition to the old/new and confidence judgments collected for each test stimulus,
we also assessed the occurrence of a de´ja` vu experience and its intensity using an on-screen
toggle system. This response system avoided unnecessarily asking participants about their
de´ja` vu experiences repeatedly, leaving them free to report the experience only when it
arose. A de´ja` vu status bar, located at the bottom of the screen had the default status “deja
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vu(d): none”. Participants reported the occurrence of de´ja` vu by pressing the ‘d’ key, which
would cycle through the intensity options. On pressing it once, the status would change to
“deja vu(d): low”. Pressing it again would result in a status change to “deja vu(d): medium”
and a third time, to “deja vu(d): high”. If the ‘d’ key was pressed a fourth time, this would
restart the cycle at “deja vu(d): none”. Participants could indicate the occurrence of de´ja`
vu at any point during each trial (i.e., during the self-paced windows for old/new and
confidence responding). The status reverted to the default “deja vu(d): none” at the start
of each new test word presentation. When participants had completed four study-test
blocks they completed the post-experimental questionnaire. The entire procedure lasted
no longer than one hour for each participant.
n-gram analysis of de´ja` vu descriptions
n-grams are continuous sequences of n words found to occur within a passage of prose.
n-grams with n= 1 are referred to as unigrams, and those with n= 2 as bigrams. Examples
of unigrams from within this sentence are “sentence” and “from”, whereas examples of
bigrams from within this sentence are “of unigrams” and “are sentence”. We identified dif-
ferences in the strings of words used to describe naturalistic and experimentally-generated
de´ja` vu by conducting a rudimentary n-gram analysis. The procedures reported here
largely mirror those reported in Selmeczy & Dobbins (2014). Prose passages from the
pre-experimental and post-experimental questionnaires underwent identical preparation
for n-gram analysis: spelling errors were corrected; contractions were completed
(e.g., “don’t” became “do not”); symbols with known meanings were written out in full
(e.g., “/” became “or”, “=” became “equals”); and “deja vu” replaced with “dejavu”.
Separately for unigrams and bigrams, we counted the number of times each n-gram
appeared in the pre- and post-experimental passages. For n-grams with total occurrences
(N) across both passages of at least the median (unigrams: 5, bigrams: 4), we used N,
the number of occurrences in the pre-experimental passage, and an assumed binomial-p
parameter of .5 to calculate a binomial distribution z value and corresponding p value of
each n-gram. As we were interested in n-grams which differentiated the two accounts, we
set an uncorrected p threshold of .05 and tabulated these n-grams for examination.
RESULTS
Whilst we do not present a comprehensive analysis of the accuracy data here—we present
key analyses in the text and summarise accuracy and confidence for all conditions in
Table 1—we show that the novelty and familiarity component manipulations of the
modified DRM task resulted in the expected behavioural changes for recognition accuracy.
We then examine the frequency of de´ja` vu reports, the intensity of de´ja` vu experiences and
finish with a descriptive n-gram analysis of the responses to the open-ended questions.
Accuracy
To establish that the DRM procedure was indeed generating erroneous familiarity for
critical lures, we conducted a one-way repeated measures ANOVA on accuracy according
to word condition (critical lure, related lure, unrelated lure, target), collapsed across list
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Table 1 Accuracy and confidence for old/new judgements and de´ja` vu likelihood according to condition. Upper-case N indicates high novelty
lists, lower-case n indicates low novelty lists. Upper-case F indicates high familiarity lists, lower-case f indicates low familiarity lists. Accuracy is
expressed as the proportion of correct responses. Confidence is expressed as the mean confidence in recognition response accuracy, where response
options ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ were coded 1, 2 and 3 respectively. De´ja` vu indicates de´ja` vu likelihood, expressed as the proportion of words
eliciting a report of de´ja` vu (of any intensity). In all cells, means are shown, followed by 95% CIs in brackets.
List
N/F N/f n/F n/f Overall
Accuracy
Critical lure .667 [.561, .773] .761 [.662, .860] .283 [.182, .384] .544 [.446, .642] .564 [.493, .635]
Related lure .731 [.653, .808] .811 [.739, .883] .769 [.703, .836] .839 [.776, .902] .788 [.731, .844]
Unrelated lure .925 [.882, .969] .933 [.897, .969] .947 [.914, .980] .928 [.888, .968] .933 [.903, .964]
Target .759 [.707, .812] .759 [.707, .812] .754 [.694, .813] .774 [.715, .833] .762 [.715, .808]
Overall .770 [.727, .814] .816 [.772, .861] .688 [.649, .728] .771 [.732, .810] .762 [.725, .798]
Confidence
Critical lure 2.34 [2.14, 2.54] 2.50 [2.30, 2.70] 1.93 [1.75, 2.12] 1.97 [1.78, 2.17] 2.19 [2.02, 2.35]
Related lure 1.98 [1.79, 2.17] 2.01 [1.82, 2.21] 1.97 [1.79, 2.14] 2.01 [1.83, 2.19] 1.99 [1.82, 2.17]
Unrelated lure 2.36 [2.16, 2.56] 2.34 [2.14, 2.53] 2.43 [2.24, 2.61] 2.33 [2.16, 2.51] 2.36 [2.18, 2.54]
Target 2.25 [2.07, 2.42] 2.39 [2.23, 2.54] 2.30 [2.14, 2.46] 2.42 [2.26, 2.57] 2.34 [2.19, 2.49]
Overall 2.23 [2.06, 2.41] 2.31 [2.15, 2.47] 2.16 [2.00, 2.31] 2.18 [2.03, 2.34] 2.22 [2.07, 2.37]
De´ja` vu
Critical lure .222 [.095, .349] .250 [.127, .373] .111 [.032, .190] .111 [.041, .181] .174 [.088, .259]
Related lure .075 [.027, .123] .064 [.016, .111] .061 [.021, .101] .069 [.029, .110] .067 [.028, .107]
Unrelated lure .011 [.000, .022] .025 [.005, .045] .025 [.005, .045] .006 [−.002, .013] .017 [.004, .029]
Target .076 [.019, .133] .052 [.000, .104] .072 [.021, .124] .057 [.004, .111] .064 [.013, .116]
Overall .096 [.049, .143] .098 [.052, .143] .067 [.027, .108] .061 [.026, .096] .080 [.041, .120]
conditions. Assumptions of sphericity were violated, χ2(5) = 11.63, p = .040, therefore
degrees of freedom were corrected with Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity, using
ε = .819. The effect of word condition on accuracy was significant, F(2.46,71.28)= 47.43,
p < .001, η2p = .621, with accuracy lowest for critical lures, as anticipated (see Table 1 for
descriptives).
To check whether our list manipulations influenced levels of erroneous familiarity, we
next conducted a 2 x (novelty: high, low) x 2 (familiarity: high, low) repeated measures
ANOVA on critical lure accuracy. There was a significant main effect of novelty, F(1,29)=
24.23, p < .001, η2p = .455, such that high novelty critical lures, M = .714 [.617, .811], were
more accurately responded to than low novelty critical lures, M = .414 [.322, .506]. There
was also a significant main effect of familiarity, F(1,29)= 51.11, p < .001, η2p = .638, such
that high familiarity critical lures, M = .475 [.394, .556], were less accurately responded
to than low familiarity critical lures, M = .653 [.583, .722]. Finally, there was a significant
interaction between novelty and familiarity, F(1,29)= 11.45, p= .002, η2p = .283. Focusing
on the main effects, it is evident that both list manipulations had the intended effects on
levels of erroneous familiarity generated for critical lures—increased novelty salience
decreased erroneous responding by drawing participants’ attention to the objective novelty
of the critical lure, whilst the lists selected from the Stadler, Rodiger & McDermott (1999)
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norms for their elevated false alarm rates also demonstrated elevated false alarms in the
current procedure.
De´ja` vu frequency
De´ja` vu was reported at least once by 18 of the 30 participants (60%). Across all
participants, the mean number of de´ja` vu reports was 12.83 [5.85, 19.82]. This value rose
to 21.39 [11.41, 31.37] in the subsample who reported at least one de´ja` vu. In the following
analyses, we analyse de´ja` vu frequency across the whole sample.
De´ja` vu occurrence was assessed on a trial by trial basis. We were therefore able to
calculate the likelihood with which a word from each condition would yield a de´ja` vu
report (see Table 1 and Fig. 2A). De´ja` vu frequency, as a proportion of all words presented
within the given combinations of conditions, was assessed in a 2 (novelty) x 2 (familiarity)
x 4 (word) repeated measures ANOVA. Assumptions of sphericity were violated for the
main effect of word, χ2(5)= 31.17,p < .001, and the interactions between word x novelty,
χ2(5) = 92.60, p < .001, word x familiarity, χ2(5) = 54.54, p < .001, and word x novelty
x familiarity, χ2(5) = 33.49, p < .001. Degrees of freedom for these effects were corrected
using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity, using ε = .564, ε = .413, ε = .482
and ε = .555 respectively. Across all effects involving familiarity however, there were no
significant differences, all ps> .350, suggesting that our manipulation of DRM strength did
not influence de´ja` vu responses independently of the other factors. We therefore present
the remaining effects involving the novelty and word conditions below.
There was a significant main effect of novelty, F(1,29) = 8.05, p = .008, η2p = .217,
with a greater frequency of de´ja` vu reports under high novelty, M = .097 [.051, .142],
than low novelty, M = .064 [.027, .101]. There was also a significant main effect of word,
F(1.69,49.10)= 10.28, p< .001, η2p = .262, driven by the high frequency of de´ja` vu reports
for critical lures (see Table 1 for descriptives).1 Both of these findings are consistent with
1 The high number of participants
reporting no de´ja` vu experiences
ensured that the de´ja` vu frequency
data were highly positively skewed
and likely do not satisfy parametric
assumptions. We therefore present
additional nonparametric tests of the
main effects reported above. Wilcoxon’s
Signed Ranks tests found no effect
of familiarity on de´ja` vu reports,
Z = −1.37, p = .171, but there was a
significant effect of novelty, Z = −2.74,
p = .006. Friedman’s test found a main
effect of word, χ2(3)= 17.04, p= .001.
Thus, the nonparametric equivalent tests
of the main effects matched the patterns
of significance obtained from parametric
tests.
our hypotheses. Although there was no graded response according to familiarity condition,
the lists contriving salient novelty generated the most de´ja` vu reports, likely driven by
the greatest conflict between DRM-induced familiarity and novelty. Consistent with this
interpretation, we were also able to show that de´ja` vu was reported more for critical lures
than any other word condition.
The novelty x word interaction was also significant, and likely responsible for both main
effects presented above, F(1.24,35.95) = 6.45, p = .011, η2p = .182. Figure 2 illustrates
the homogeneity of responding within word conditions, which is broken only for critical
lures. Crucially, critical lures in the low novelty condition remained comparable to other
word conditions in their likelihood of yielding de´ja` vu reports, in the region of 10%,
whereas those in the high novelty condition elicited de´ja` vu responding around 25% of the
time. The presence of salient novelty, whereby participants were made aware that stimuli
which they otherwise found to be familiar could not be so, appears important in elevating
categorical reports of de´ja` vu within this procedure.
Our hypothesised elevation of de´ja` vu responses in maximal clash conditions was
predicated upon participants correctly identifying critical lures as objectively new. To
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Figure 2 Likelihood of de´ja` vu responding according to list and word condition. (A) Shows the
likelihood of a de´ja` vu response according to list and word type collapsed across recognition response
correctness. Upper-case N indicates high novelty lists (blue hues), lower-case n indicates low novelty lists
(orange hues). Upper-case F indicates high familiarity lists, lower-case f indicates low familiarity lists.
(B) Shows the likelihood of a de´ja` vu response according to novelty manipulation (N is high novelty lists
(blue), n is low novelty lists (orange)) and word type (cl, critical lure; rl, related lure; ul, unrelated lure;
t, target), split according to correct (left panel) and incorrect (right panel) recognition responding. Error
bars represent 95% CIs.
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establish that the described pattern of de´ja` vu responses persisted in items to which
participants had given correct recognition responses but not incorrect recognition
responses, we recalculated de´ja` vu response likelihoods according to recognition response
correctness (Fig. 2B). Given the ineffectiveness of the familiarity manipulation in
influencing de´ja` vu frequency above, we collapsed across familiarity conditions so as to
compare only high and low novelty lists by word condition. In a 2 (novelty) x 4 (word)
repeated measures ANOVA on de´ja` vu responses to correctly identified words, assumptions
of sphericity were violated for the main effect of word, χ2(5) = 41.30, p < .001, and the
interaction, χ2(5)= 105.37, p < .001. Degrees of freedom for these effects were corrected
using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity, using ε = .565 and ε = .385 respectively.
The main effect of novelty was no longer significant, F(1,26) = 3.63, p = .068, η2p = .123,
though the main effect of word survived, F(1.70,44.11)= 8.85, p < .001, η2p = .241, again
carried by the elevated de´ja` vu responding to critical lures.2 The novelty x word interaction
2 Nonparametric tests of the main effects
within correctly identified words found
significant effects of both novelty,
Z = −2.74, p = .006, and word,
χ2(3) = 12.77, p = .005. Whilst the
nonparametric test significances do
not match their parametric equivalents
above, they do match the parametric
and nonparametric significances
for the overall data, collapsed across
correctness.
was no longer significant, F(1.16,30.06) = 2.16, p = .100, η2p = .077. In an equivalent
ANOVA for incorrect responses there were no main effects of novelty, F(1,12) = 3.11,
p = .103, η2p = .206, or word, F < 1, and no significant interaction, F < 1.3 Although the
3 Nonparametric tests within incor-
rectly identified words also found
nonsignificant effects of novelty,
Z = −0.36, p = .723, and word,
χ2(3)= 5.04,p= .169.
previously described effects are attenuated when split according to recognition response
correctness, there is nothing to suggest that the hypothesised elevation in de´ja` vu responses
was driven by responses to critical lures which participants have incorrectly identified as
old. There is therefore little indication that the overall findings relating to de´ja` vu frequency
are driven by stimuli to which participants should be reporting no more than baseline
levels of de´ja` vu.
De´ja` vu intensity
De´ja` vu intensity was measured after the presentation of each word and coded as being
rated from 1 (low) to 3 (high). We were interested in whether de´ja` vu, once reported,
differed in intensity according to list condition. We again collapsed across familiarity
conditions so as to compare de´ja` vu intensities across high and low novelty lists. We
also restricted our analysis to critical lures, the stimuli in which de´ja` vu reports were
most frequent, to avoid the problem of empty cells decimating the analysis. Fourteen
participants reported de´ja` vu under both novelty conditions. A repeated measures t-test
found no significant difference between de´ja` vu intensity ratings for high novelty critical
lures, M = 1.67, [1.31, 2.03], and low novelty critical lures, M = 1.79, [1.38, 2.21],
t(13) = −0.69, p = .503 d = −.196. (There were too few participants reporting de´ja` vu
in both novelty conditions to warrant further analysis of the data subdivided according to
correct [9 participants] and incorrect [4 participants] recognition responses.) Overall, de´ja`
vu intensity did not vary according to novelty condition.
De´ja` vu descriptions
In order to quantitatively explore discursive accounts of naturalistic and experimentally-
generated de´ja` vu experiences, we excluded participants who had never experienced de´ja`
vu or who did not experience de´ja` vu in the experiment. This left us with a subsample of 15
participants. We conducted n-gram analyses on these participants’ accounts of naturalistic
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and experimentally-generated de´ja` vu. Unigrams and bigrams which significantly
differentiate naturalistic and experimental experiences of de´ja` vu are listed in Table 2,
wherein positive z values indicate n-grams which were used in the descriptions of previous
de´ja` vu experiences significantly more than the experimental de´ja` vu experiences. Negative
z values indicate n-grams which showed the opposite pattern of correspondence.
A common thread across unigrams and bigrams was the presence of words describing
the specificity of the de´ja` vu experience in question. Experimental reports of de´ja` vu were
characterised by descriptions relating to the stimuli (“word[s]”, “the word[s]”), modality
of presentation (“seen”, “had seen”) and the setting (“experiment”, “the experiment”)
e.g., “Sometimes, I had a very slight feeling that I had seen a particular word before”.
Naturalistic de´ja` vu experiences were more generalised (“situation”, “experience”)
e.g., “Typically a scenario or situation I am in just seems familiar”. In this respect,
experimental reports of de´ja` vu appear to be in response to an experience which is more
restricted to certain stimuli within the environment than naturalistic de´ja` vu experiences.
A related dimension along which there was the suggestion of differentiation was the
duration of the experience. “Minutes” was used disproportionately to describe naturalistic
experiences e.g., “A typical deja vu experience for me lasts a couple of minutes”. “Seconds”
appeared in the unthresholded table, but was not diagnostic of one or other category
of experience (naturalistic: 4, experimental: 3, z = .352, p = 1.00) and was used in
similar contexts across accounts e.g., naturalistic—“It lasted only a few seconds. . . ,” and
experimental—“The deja vu last only a few seconds each time”. In general, it would appear
that the experimental experience was restricted to a shorter duration than that to which
naturalistic de´ja` vu experiences can extend, though this generalisation did not fit with all
participants’ experiences e.g., the following from a description of the experimental de´ja` vu:
“The duration was longer than previously experienced deja vu but also fainter”.
More generally, these accounts offer insights into the nature of the experimentally-
generated experience not afforded by the dichotomous or categorical response options
available to them in the experiment itself. Specifically, some participants who used the
toggle system to indicate that they had experienced de´ja` vu were much more cautious
about describing the experimental experience as de´ja` vu when given the opportunity to
explain their experience more precisely e.g., “I am unsure whether it was exactly deja vu
but in some cases I saw words usually words I was expecting to see in the groups but did
not, and it felt as if I had seen them”. and “I am not really sure I had the two deja vu I
reported, or if I think I had them only because it was the task of the experiment”. Others
reiterated what would be inferred from their categorical responses e.g., “The feeling of
deja vu experience is quite strong but I only felt it when certain words came up, when
it moved on to the next word... the feeling disappeared...”. These accounts raise the
question of whether demand characteristics and response acquiescence are important
in influencing categorical responses in studies such as this one. Whilst this may not apply to
all participants, there are clearly some participants for whom discursive response options
give the experimenter a clearer idea of the inferences they should be making based on
participant responses.
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Table 2 n-grams differentiating naturalistic and experimentally-generated de´ja` vu. The n-gram col-
umn shows unigrams and bigrams which (a) occurred with a frequency of at least the median (5 for
unigrams, 4 for bigrams) across all text within the descriptions of naturalistic and experimental de´ja` vu
occurrences and (b) were significantly disproportionately represented (p < .05) in one or other set of
descriptions. The naturalistic and experimental headings quantify occurrences of the n-grams within the
corresponding set of descriptions across all amalgamated accounts. N is the total count across both sets
of descriptions, z is the binomial distribution z value calculated using the listed n-gram frequencies and
an assumed binomial-p parameter of .5, and p is the probability of obtaining this z value by chance.
n-gram Previous Experimental N z p
Unigrams have 21 3 24 3.67 0.000
usually 12 1 13 3.05 0.001
is 18 4 22 2.98 0.001
minutes 6 0 6 2.45 0.007
feel 12 3 15 2.32 0.010
any 5 0 5 2.24 0.013
situation 5 0 5 2.24 0.013
typical 5 0 5 2.24 0.013
experience 13 4 17 2.18 0.015
a 34 19 53 2.06 0.020
for 8 2 10 1.90 0.029
are 6 1 7 1.89 0.029
familiar 6 1 7 1.89 0.029
makes 6 1 7 1.89 0.029
same 6 1 7 1.89 0.029
before 14 6 20 1.79 0.037
me 18 9 27 1.73 0.042
but 10 19 29 −1.67 0.047
whether 3 9 12 −1.73 0.042
I 64 87 151 −1.87 0.031
had 11 24 35 −2.20 0.014
come 0 5 5 −2.24 0.013
during 0 5 5 −2.24 0.013
experiment 0 5 5 −2.24 0.013
knew 0 5 5 −2.24 0.013
new 0 5 5 −2.24 0.013
old 0 5 5 −2.24 0.013
did 1 8 9 −2.33 0.010
sure 0 6 6 −2.45 0.007
up 0 8 8 −2.83 0.002
seen 1 11 12 −2.89 0.002
was 12 32 44 −3.02 0.001
were 0 11 11 −3.32 0.000
the 35 70 105 −3.42 0.000
word 0 17 17 −4.12 0.000
words 0 19 19 −4.36 0.000
(continued on next page)
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Table 2 (continued)
n-gram Previous Experimental N z p
Bigrams I have 14 1 15 3.36 0.000
it is 8 1 9 2.33 0.010
been in 5 0 5 2.24 0.013
do not 5 0 5 2.24 0.013
is not 5 0 5 2.24 0.013
a typical 4 0 4 2.00 0.023
it usually 4 0 4 2.00 0.023
that my 4 0 4 2.00 0.023
think that 4 0 4 2.00 0.023
have been 6 1 7 1.89 0.029
makes me 6 1 7 1.89 0.029
come up 0 4 4 −2.00 0.023
I would 0 4 4 −2.00 0.023
the experiment 0 4 4 −2.00 0.023
the feeling 0 4 4 −2.00 0.023
the list 0 4 4 −2.00 0.023
what i 0 4 4 −2.00 0.023
word was 0 4 4 −2.00 0.023
words i 0 4 4 −2.00 0.023
words that 0 4 4 −2.00 0.023
during the 0 5 5 −2.24 0.013
I knew 0 5 5 −2.24 0.013
did not 0 6 6 −2.45 0.007
had not 0 6 6 −2.45 0.007
had seen 0 6 6 −2.45 0.007
it was 1 9 10 −2.53 0.006
the words 0 7 7 −2.65 0.004
in the 1 10 11 −2.71 0.003
I had 5 20 25 −3.00 0.001
the word 0 13 13 −3.61 0.000
DISCUSSION
The modified DRM task reliably elicited categorical de´ja` vu reports. These de´ja` vu
reports varied consistently, largely with our expectations—they were most likely to
occur for inappropriately familiar words for which we contrived a clash between illusory
familiarity and salient novelty. We showed an increased frequency of de´ja` vu reports
when we elevated the awareness of objective novelty, but not when we elevated strength
of DRM-induced familiarity alone. Examination of written accounts allowed us to contrast
previously experienced naturalistic experiences of de´ja` vu with those resulting from the
experimental procedures, suggesting that, whilst the experimentally-generated experience
may approximate naturalistic de´ja` vu, it is more restricted in its focus. The written
accounts also highlighted the potential influence of demand characteristics in elevating
the frequency of de´ja` vu reports provided in categorical responses alone.
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Our procedure captures a critical feature of de´ja` vu, the clash between subjective
familiarity and objective novelty (Brown, 2004). Whilst our analyses compared the
frequency of de´ja` vu reports according to the list-wise novelty manipulation, it should also
be noted that each list, regardless of the novelty condition, included semantically related
lures for which familiarity would have been high and novelty salience was low. Thus, we
had both between-list and within-list controls for our high novelty critical lures (critical
lures in the low novelty lists and related lures in the high novelty lists respectively). Both
of these word conditions were highly familiar yet lacked verifiable novelty and tellingly,
yielded significantly lower de´ja` vu reports than the critical stimuli. Stimuli in either one
of these control conditions can be compared to those previously reported as generating
de´ja` vu through familiarity without recollection alone (e.g., Brown & Marsh, 2009; Cleary,
Ryals & Nomi, 2009) and the baseline levels of de´ja` vu reported for these stimuli, are
consistent with the tendency for participants to report de´ja` vu under these circumstances.
Importantly though, introducing verifiable novelty doubled de´ja` vu report rates, with this
elevation seemingly driven by critical lures correctly identified as novel rather than those
about whose objective status participants were confused. It remains to be seen whether
contriving objectively verifiable novelty within the alternative procedures would elevate
de´ja` vu responding further, as would be consistent with our operationalisation of the
experience.
The precise role of objective novelty within the de´ja` vu experience remains to be
established. It may be that novelty is absolutely necessary to establish that the familiarity in
question is indeed illusory. Under these circumstances, the inappropriate familiarity signal
should be indistinguishable from a conventional familiarity signal, with de´ja` vu emerging
only from the combination of familiarity and novelty signals indicating that one of them
must be wrong. Alternatively, verifiable novelty may help to confirm that the familiarity
signal is illusory, though something carried in the familiarity signal alone—some intrinsic
indicator that it is inappropriate—may be sufficient to achieve this. That de´ja` vu in the
healthy population has no behavioural consequences and therefore that people tend always
to discount the illusory familiarity signal (as opposed to de´ja` ve´cu) supports the second
alternative. (At this point, it is worth noting that the association between elevated de´ja`
vu responding and increased accuracy to critical lures in the current analogue mirrors
the appropriate decision-making that accompanies naturalistic de´ja` vu experiences in the
healthy population.) In any case, verifiable novelty tends to make for a very compelling
argument that the familiarity experienced is inappropriate and may therefore lend itself to
being told to others and remembered as an archetypal de´ja` vu experience. De´ja` vu for an
event which can never have happened before (e.g., Pasteur’s funeral, Berrios, 1995) or in a
country one has never previously visited (e.g., in France, O’Connor, Lever & Moulin, 2010)
is bound to be more compelling than de´ja` vu during one’s daily commute. Thus, the salient
novelty with our experimental analogue may bring it closer to the de´ja` vu experiences
people report to each other, than analogues without this component.
Despite the definitional improvement, the current procedure was still unable to generate
de´ja` vu in 40% of participants, whilst eliciting a large number of de´ja` vu experiences
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in the other 60%. It is unclear why the procedure is so variable in its effectiveness. One
possibility, which draws on data from the discursive responses, is that some participants
may view the experimentally-generated sensation as too restricted in its specificity to
warrant being called de´ja` vu. The restriction to single word stimuli is a key component of
the DRM procedure and it is difficult to see how this could be overcome whilst continuing
to generate erroneous familiarity in this manner. Nonetheless, the use of secondary tasks to
generate verifiable novelty could be successful in other procedures for which richer stimuli
have been used to generate reports of de´ja` vu or erroneous familiarity (e.g., Cleary, Ryals
& Nomi, 2009; Brown & Marsh, 2008). A comparison of experimental de´ja` vu report rates
across stimuli of differing richness would offer insight into the degree to which stimulus
complexity and coherence affects participants’ willingness to report the experience, and
therefore the face validity of the experimentally generated sensation itself.
The absence of a novelty effect on de´ja` vu intensity, is also worth considering here.
There may be a number of reasons for this finding including: (i) that questions about
de´ja` vu intensity are responded to more conservatively than questions about de´ja` vu
occurrence; (ii) that once elicited, de´ja` vu intensity does not correspond to the strength
of its trigger to elicit frequent de´ja` vu reports; and relatedly (iii) that de´ja` vu is an
‘all-or-nothing’ categorical process. That there were no floor effects in the compared
intensity ratings argues against explanation (i). The other explanations however, warrant
further investigation. Explanation (ii) could be falsified relatively easily. With refinement of
the current procedure to generate de´ja` vu at varying frequencies, intensity ratings could
be collected at each level, with a view to establishing a relationship between the two
variables. The presence of a frequency-intensity relationship at some levels of frequency
would suggest that the null finding here is caused by a failure to calibrate the current
search appropriately. The absence of a relationship across all levels would suggest that
the relationship between de´ja` vu intensity and the likelihood of de´ja` vu generation is
not straightforward—a correspondence between the two continuous variables could
either be absent or, according to explanation (iii), impossible. In this and previous
work conducted in the lab, participants have been able to quantify the intensity of their
de´ja` vu experiences on a continuous scale indicating that, counter to explanation (iii),
de´ja` vu is not subjectively experienced as categorical. Similarly though, other memory
experiences which are often conceptualised as categorical can be continuously quantified
by participants (e.g., recollection; Yonelinas, 1994; Mickes, Wais & Wixted, 2009). Thus the
nature of the de´ja` vu experience, as categorical or continuous in its presence and intensity,
remains to be fully established.
Within this report, we have largely referred to the analysis of discursive responses as
a counterpoint to the categorical self-reports of de´ja` vu collected during the modified
DRM task. However, our n-gram analyses are also prone to bias from the question used to
generate discursive accounts, which we may have introduced by asking participants about
a “typical” past experience of de´ja` vu. Instead of detailing a specific episode which typifies
their experience of de´ja` vu, many participants spoke in general terms about typical de´ja` vu
experiences, which will undoubtedly have influenced our comparison of the two accounts.
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We acknowledge that this method could be improved by simply modifying the question
asked, but also suggest that further developments to this procedure may be valuable,
especially in an attempt to better understand the subjective experience beyond simple
extrapolation from categorical responses to questions about such unusual experiences.
One such approach is to train support vector machines (SVMs) to more objectively classify
discursive responses as belonging to one or other category of experience. This approach
requires a larger corpus of text than was collected in this experiment, but which could
be obtained if participants were asked to describe a greater number of previous and
experimentally generated de´ja` vu experiences. Selmeczy & Dobbins (2014) successfully
applied SVMs to demonstrate that linguistic content differs according to the recognition
memory processes engaged at retrieval and we suggest that such approaches could also be
applied to the study of de´ja` vu experiences.
Finally, despite progress towards a viable laboratory analogue, the pattern of de´ja` vu
reports from the current experiments highlights a pervasive, problematic issue within
the field. Whilst de´ja` vu was significantly more likely to be reported for critical lures, it
was nonetheless also reported for other words. O’Connor & Moulin (2010) suggest that
such non-hypothesised reporting (and therefore a proportion of hypothesised reporting)
is driven by demand characteristics (Orne, 1962), a point highlighted by one participant
in their discursive response. To minimise this artifact, O’Connor and Moulin suggested
that de´ja` vu be assessed by post-experimental questionnaire alone, thereby reducing the
trial-by-trial suggestion that de´ja` vu should be occurring. We found this impractical
when seeking to identify specific words triggers of de´ja` vu reports, and implemented a
toggle system using which participants could ignore the question of de´ja` vu occurrence
until it became pertinent. Nonetheless, the persistent cue may still have acted to reinforce
acquiescent responding. Alternative methods of questioning which afford both trial-level
specificity and minimal pressure to acquiesce would add further credibility to reports
proposing laboratory analogues of de´ja` vu. In their absence however, reporting procedures
which allow participants to contextualise their responses go some way towards clarifying
the features of a naturalistic experience that are both well and poorly represented by
analogues such as this.
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